Results for 'Some Evidence is False'

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  1. Some Evidence is False.Alexander Arnold - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (1):165 - 172.
    According to some philosophers who accept a propositional conception of evidence, someone's evidence includes a proposition only if it is true. I argue against this thesis by appealing to the possibility of knowledge from falsehood.
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  2. Australasian Journal of Philosophy Contents of Volume 91.Present Desire Satisfaction, Past Well-Being, Volatile Reasons, Epistemic Focal Bias, Some Evidence is False, Counting Stages, Vague Entailment, What Russell Couldn'T. Describe, Liberal Thinking & Intentional Action First - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (4).
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  3. Even if it might not be true, evidence cannot be false.Clayton Littlejohn & Julien Dutant - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (3):801-827.
    Wordly internalists claim that while internal duplicates always share the same evidence, our evidence includes non-trivial propositions about our environment. It follows that some evidence is false. Worldly internalism is thought to provide a more satisfying answer to scepticism than classical internalist views that deny that these propositions about our environment might belong to our evidence and to provide a generally more attractive account of rationality and reasons for belief. We argue that worldly internalism (...)
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  4. No Evidence is False.Clayton Littlejohn - 2013 - Acta Analytica 28 (2):145-159.
    If evidence is propositional, is one’s evidence limited to true propositions or might false propositions constitute evidence? In this paper, I consider three recent attempts to show that there can be ‘false evidence,’ and argue that each of these attempts fails. The evidence for the thesis that evidence consists of truths is much stronger than the evidence offered in support of the theoretical assumptions that people have relied on to argue against (...)
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  5. False Beliefs and Misleading Evidence.Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2021 - Theoria 87 (3):520-541.
    False beliefs and misleading evidence have striking similarities. In many regards, they are both epistemically bad or undesirable. Yet, some epistemologists think that, while one’s evidence is normative (i.e., one’s available evidence affects the doxastic states one is epistemically permitted or required to have), one’s false beliefs cannot be evidence and cannot be normative. They have offered various motivations for treating false beliefs differently from true misleading beliefs, and holding that only the (...)
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  6. Misleading Evidence and the Dogmatism Puzzle.Ru Ye - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (3):563-575.
    ABSTRACTAccording to the Dogmatism Puzzle presented by Gilbert Harman, knowledge induces dogmatism because, if one knows that p, one knows that any evidence against p is misleading and therefore one can ignore it when gaining the evidence in the future. I try to offer a new solution to the puzzle by explaining why the principle is false that evidence known to be misleading can be ignored. I argue that knowing that some evidence is misleading (...)
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  7. Evil is not Evidence.Mike Almeida - 2022 - Religious Studies 1 (1):1-9.
    The paper aims to show that, if S5 is the logic of metaphysical necessity, then no state of affairs in any possible world constitutes any non-trivial evidence for or against the existence of the traditional God. There might well be states of affairs in some worlds describing extraordinary goods and extraordinary evils, but it is false that these states of affairs constitute any (non-trivial) evidence for or against the existence of God. The epistemological and metaphysical consequences (...)
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  8. Imprecise evidence without imprecise credences.Jennifer Rose Carr - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (9):2735-2758.
    Does rationality require imprecise credences? Many hold that it does: imprecise evidence requires correspondingly imprecise credences. I argue that this is false. The imprecise view faces the same arbitrariness worries that were meant to motivate it in the first place. It faces these worries because it incorporates a certain idealization. But doing away with this idealization effectively collapses the imprecise view into a particular kind of precise view. On this alternative, our attitudes should reflect a kind of normative (...)
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  9.  66
    Truthmaking, Evidence Of, and Impossibility Proofs.Adrian Heathcote - 2014 - Acta Analytica 29 (3):363-375.
    Beginning with Zagzebski (The Philosophical Quarterly 44:65–73, 1994), some philosophers have argued that there can be no solution to the Gettier counterexamples within the framework of a fallibilist theory of knowledge. If true, this would be devastating, since it is believed on good grounds that infallibilism leads to scepticism. But I argue here that these purported proofs are mistaken and that the truthmaker solution to the Gettier problems is both cogent and fallibilist in nature. To show this I develop (...)
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  10.  57
    Evidence and truth.Roger White - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (3):1049-1057.
    Among other interesting proposals, Juan Comesaña’s _Being Rational and Being Right_ makes a challenging case that one’s evidence can include falsehoods. I explore some ways in which we might have to rethink the roles that evidence can play in inquiry if we accept this claim. It turns out that Comesaña’s position lends itself to the conclusion that while false evidence is possible and not even terribly uncommon, I can be rationally sure that I don’t currently (...)
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  11.  71
    Why Is Logic A Priori?Richard Warner - 1989 - The Monist 72 (1):40-51.
    Consider the proposition, “Neither the motion of a body nor the action of a force affects space and time themselves”. We rejected this proposition when, in accepting the general theory of relativity, we accepted that the movement of a body or the action of a force affects the curvature of space-time. Compare the following proposition: “p and if and only if or ”. We think this is logically true; at least, most of us do. Some don’t, on empirical grounds—claiming (...)
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  12. Is egocentric bias evidence for simulation theory.Annika Wallin - 2011 - Synthese 178 (3):503-514.
    Revised simulation theory allows mental state attributions containing some or all of the attributor's genuine, non-simulated mental states. It is thought that this gives the revised theory an empirical advantage, because unlike theory theory and rationality theory, it can explain egocentric bias. I challenge this view, arguing that theory theory and rationality theory can explain egocentricity by appealing to heuristic mindreading and the diagnosticity of attributors' own beliefs, and that these explanations are as simple and consistent as those provided (...)
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  13. Is the experience of pain transparent? Introspecting Phenomenal Qualities.Murat Aydede - 2019 - Synthese 196 (2):677-708.
    I distinguish between two claims of transparency of experiences. One claim is weaker and supported by phenomenological evidence. This I call the transparency datum. Introspection of standard perceptual experiences as well as bodily sensations is consistent with, indeed supported by, the transparency datum. I formulate a stronger transparency thesis that is entailed by representationalism about experiential phenomenology. I point out some empirical consequences of strong transparency in the context of representationalism. I argue that pain experiences, as well as (...)
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  14.  54
    Linguistic Evidence and Substantive Epistemic Contextualism.Ron Wilburn - 2021 - Logos and Episteme 12 (1):53-76.
    Epistemic contextualism is the thesis that the standards that must be met by a knowledge claimant vary with contexts of utterance. Thus construed, EC may concern only knowledge claims, or else the knowledge relation itself. Herein, my concern is with “Substantive EC.” Let’s call the claim that the sorts of linguistic evidence commonly cited in support of Semantic EC also imply or support Substantive EC the “Implication Thesis”. IP is a view about which some epistemologists have equivocated. Keith (...)
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  15.  18
    Some Basic Fallacies of the People of the Book in the Qurʾān.Yunus AKÇA - 2021 - Cumhuriyet İlahiyat Dergisi 25 (3):961-982.
    The phenomenon of fallacy is directly related to the nature of the person himself and the environment in which he lives. Knowing in which situations and how people are wrong will greatly prevent them from making Fallacies. For this reason, one of the most important aims of religions is to bring their followers to the happiness in this world and the hereafter, to determine the Fallacies that people may fall into beforehand and to reveal their reasons and solutions. The religions (...)
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  16. What Is It to Be Happy That P?Jeremy Fantl - 2015 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 2.
    This paper offers a new argument that your reasons for believing or acting need not be true. It proceeds indirectly through an account of what it takes to be happy that p. To be happy that p is for p to be among your reasons for being happy. That’s because questions about why you’re happy and what you’re happy is the case are interchangeable. But, I argue, it is possible to be happy that p even when p is false. (...)
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  17.  58
    Calculating and understanding the value of any type of match evidence when there are potential testing errors.Norman Fenton, Martin Neil & Anne Hsu - 2014 - Artificial Intelligence and Law 22 (1):1-28.
    It is well known that Bayes’ theorem (with likelihood ratios) can be used to calculate the impact of evidence, such as a ‘match’ of some feature of a person. Typically the feature of interest is the DNA profile, but the method applies in principle to any feature of a person or object, including not just DNA, fingerprints, or footprints, but also more basic features such as skin colour, height, hair colour or even name. Notwithstanding concerns about the extensiveness (...)
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  18. Approximate Truth, Quasi-Factivity, and Evidence.Michael J. Shaffer - 2015 - Acta Analytica 30 (3):249-266.
    The main question addressed in this paper is whether some false sentences can constitute evidence for the truth of other propositions. In this paper it is argued that there are good reasons to suspect that at least some false propositions can constitute evidence for the truth of certain other contingent propositions. The paper also introduces a novel condition concerning propositions that constitute evidence that explains a ubiquitous evidential practice and it contains a defense (...)
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  19.  28
    Evidence-based Medicine: Why do Opponents and Proponents use the same Arguments?A. Gerber & K. W. Lauterbach - 2005 - Health Care Analysis 13 (1):59-71.
    There is quite some ethical controversy on Evidence-based Medicine (EbM) with regard to issues of physician autonomy as well as its allocative implications. Yet, there are some shortcomings in the current debate. First of all, some of the arguments brought up against EbM are similarly defaults of “classical medicine” as well, for instance its negligence of social aspects of medicine. Second, it is often maintained that EbM is just a tool to attain cost containment. This argument (...)
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  20. The evidence in perception.Ali Hasan - 2023 - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. New York, NY: Routledge.
    It is commonly thought that we depend fundamentally on the “evidence of the senses” for our empicial beliefs, including and most directly, our beliefs about our local environment, the spatial world around us. The ultimate evidence we have for our perceptual beliefs is provided in some way by perception or perceptual experience. But what is this evidence? There seem to be three main options: external factualism allows that the evidence include facts about the external world; (...)
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  21.  88
    What Do False-Belief Tests Show?Pierre Jacob - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (1):1-20.
    In a paper published in Psychological Review, Tyler Burge has offered a unified non-mentalistic account of a wide range of social cognitive developmental findings. His proposal is that far from attributing mental states, young children attribute to humans the same kind of internal generic states of sensory registration that biologists attribute to e.g. snails and ticks. Burge’s proposal deserves close attention: it is especially challenging because it departs from both the mentalistic and all the non-mentalistic accounts of the data so (...)
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  22. Miscarriage Is Not a Cause of Death: A Response to Berg’s “Abortion and Miscarriage”.Nicholas Colgrove - 2021 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 46 (4):394-413.
    Some opponents of abortion claim that fetuses are persons from the moment of conception. Following Berg (2017), let us call these individuals “Personhood-At-Conception” (or PAC), opponents of abortion. Berg argues that if fetuses are persons from the moment of conception, then miscarriage kills far more people than abortion. As such, PAC opponents of abortion face the following dilemma: They must “immediately” and “substantially” shift their attention, resources, etc., toward preventing miscarriage or they must admit that they do not actually (...)
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  23. Peer Disagreement, Evidence, and Well-Groundedness.Han van Wietmarschen - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (3):395-425.
    The central question of the peer disagreement debate is: what should you believe about the disputed proposition if you have good reason to believe that an epistemic peer disagrees with you? This article shows that this question is ambiguous between evidential support (or propositional justification) and well-groundedness (or doxastic justification). The discussion focuses on conciliatory views, according to which peer disagreements require you to significantly revise your view or to suspend judgment. The article argues that for a wide range of (...)
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  24.  27
    Text without Context: Some Errors of Stanley Fish.Gregory Currie - 1991 - Philosophy and Literature 15 (2):212-228.
    In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Gregory Currie TEXT WITHOUT CONTEXT: SOME ERRORS OF STANLEY FISH "Intuition told him that the vast ineptitude of the venture would serve as proof that no fraud was afoot." —Jorge Luis Borges, "Tom Castro, the Implausible Imposter," in A Universal History ofInfamy There are those of us who seek unity, universality, patterns of invariance in any diverse multitude of particulars. With the interpretation of texts, the diversity is (...)
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  25.  22
    Caregiver reactions to neuroimaging evidence of covert consciousness in patients with severe brain injury: a qualitative interview study.Charles Weijer, Adrian M. Owen, Sarah Munce, Laura Elizabeth Gonzalez-Lara, Fiona Webster & Andrew Peterson - 2021 - BMC Medical Ethics 22 (1):1-13.
    BackgroundSevere brain injury is a leading cause of death and disability. Diagnosis and prognostication are difficult, and errors occur often. Novel neuroimaging methods can improve diagnostic and prognostic accuracy, especially in patients with prolonged disorders of consciousness (PDoC). Yet it is currently unknown how family caregivers understand this information, raising ethical concerns that disclosure of neuroimaging results could result in therapeutic misconception or false hope.MethodsTo examine these ethical concerns, we conducted semi-structured interviews with caregivers of patients with PDoC who (...)
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  26. Is Neurolaw Conceptually Confused?Neil Levy - 2014 - The Journal of Ethics 18 (2):171-185.
    In Minds, Brains, and Law, Michael Pardo and Dennis Patterson argue that current attempts to use neuroscience to inform the theory and practice of law founder because they are built on confused conceptual foundations. Proponents of neurolaw attribute to the brain or to its parts psychological properties that belong only to people; this mistake vitiates many of the claims they make. Once neurolaw is placed on a sounder conceptual footing, Pardo and Patterson claim, we will see that its more dramatic (...)
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  27.  32
    Unacceptable Generalizations in Arguments on Legal Evidence.Christian Dahlman - 2017 - Argumentation 31 (1):83-99.
    Arguments on legal evidence rely on generalizations, that link a certain circumstance to a certain hypothesis and warrants the claim that the circumstance makes the hypothesis more probable. Some generalizations are acceptable and others are unacceptable. A generalization can be unacceptable on at least four different grounds. A false generalization is unacceptable because membership in the reference class does not increase the probability of the hypothesis. A non-robust generalization is unacceptable because it uses a reference class that (...)
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  28.  28
    From Infants to Great Apes: False Belief Attribution and Primitivism About Truth.Joseph Ulatowski & Jeremy Wyatt - 2023 - In David Bordonaba-Plou (ed.), Experimental Philosophy of Language: Perspectives, Methods, and Prospects. Springer Verlag. pp. 263-286.
    There is a growing body of empirical evidence which shows that infants and non-human primates have the ability to represent the mental states of other agents, i.e. that they possess a Theory of Mind. We will argue that this evidence also suggests that infants and non-human primates possess the concept of truth, which, as we will explain, is good news for primitivists about truth. First, we will offer a brief overview of alethic primitivism, focusing on Jamin Asay’s conceptual (...)
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  29.  26
    False Cause.Bertha Alvarez Manninen - 2018-05-09 - In Robert Arp, Steven Barbone & Michael Bruce (eds.), Bad Arguments. Wiley. pp. 338–341.
    In general, the false cause fallacy occurs when the “link between premises and conclusion depends on some imagined causal connection that probably does not exist”. There are three different ways an argument can commit the false cause fallacy: post hoc ergo propter hoc; cum hoc ergo propter hoc; and ignoring common cause. This chapter focuses on one of the common fallacies in Western philosophy, 'ignoring common cause'. The commercial exploited the false cause fallacy to get consumers (...)
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  30. Bayesian Induction Is Eliminative Induction.James Hawthorne - 1993 - Philosophical Topics 21 (1):99-138.
    Eliminative induction is a method for finding the truth by using evidence to eliminate false competitors. It is often characterized as "induction by means of deduction"; the accumulating evidence eliminates false hypotheses by logically contradicting them, while the true hypothesis logically entails the evidence, or at least remains logically consistent with it. If enough evidence is available to eliminate all but the most implausible competitors of a hypothesis, then (and only then) will the hypothesis (...)
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  31.  39
    Is the replication crisis a base-rate fallacy?Bengt Autzen - 2021 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 42 (5):233-243.
    Is science in the midst of a crisis of replicability and false discoveries? In a recent article, Alexander Bird offers an explanation for the apparent lack of replicability in the biomedical sciences. Bird argues that the surprise at the failure to replicate biomedical research is a result of the fallacy of neglecting the base rate. The base-rate fallacy arises in situations in which one ignores the base rate—or prior probability—of an event when assessing the probability of this event in (...)
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  32.  77
    Is nondefectively justified true belief knowledge?Dale Jacquette - 1996 - Ratio 9 (2):115-127.
    The traditional conception of knowledge as justified true belief is refuted in two famous counterexamples by Edmund L. Gettier. Roderick M. Chisholm has attempted to rescue a version of the traditional conception by distinguishing between defective and nondefective kinds of justification, and redefining knowledge more specifically as nondefectively justified true belief. Chisholm's revised definition avoids Gettier's counterexamples, but goes too far in the opposite direction, imposing conditions that are too narrow and not jointly necessary for knowledge. Chisholm's definition excludes (...) claims that intuitively constitute genuine knowledge1 by entailing that if a true belief is invalidated as knowledge when defectively justified by a total body of evidence that also makes evident at least one false proposition, then no knowledge whatsoever can be supported by the same evidence. An alternative analysis of knowledge is proposed, according to which the potential loophole between the state of affairs that justifies belief in a proposition, and the state of affairs that makes the proposition true, permitted by the traditional concept of knowledge and discovered by Gettier's counterexamples, is closed by redefining knowledge as semantically‐epistemically evidentially relevant justified true belief. (shrink)
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  33. Some logico-semantical themes in Karl Olivecrona's philosophy of law: A non-exegetical approach.Lennart Åqvist - 2008 - Theoria 74 (4):271-294.
    The paper deals with certain issues with which Olivecrona was mainly concerned in his Philosophy of Law, notably (i) his views about the logical or syntactical form of imperatives as used in the law, and (ii) his views on the semantics of imperatives in the law and on the question whether and to what extent the notions of truth and falsity are applicable to those imperatives at all. In the light of an important critical notice of Olivecrona's work by Marc-Wogau (...)
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  34. A Defense of Taking Some Novels As Arguments.Gilbert Plumer - 2015 - In B. J. Garssen, D. Godden, G. Mitchell & A. F. Snoeck Henkemans (eds.), Proceedings of the 8th International Conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation [CD-ROM]. Sic Sat. pp. 1169-1177.
    This paper’s main thesis is that in virtue of being believable, a believable novel makes an indirect transcendental argument telling us something about the real world of human psychology, action, and society. Three related objections are addressed. First, the Stroud-type objection would be that from believability, the only conclusion that could be licensed concerns how we must think or conceive of the real world. Second, Currie holds that such notions are probably false: the empirical evidence “is all against (...)
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  35. Why Is Proof the Only Way to Acquire Mathematical Knowledge?Marc Lange - 2024 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 102 (2):333-353.
    This paper proposes an account of why proof is the only way to acquire knowledge of some mathematical proposition’s truth. Admittedly, non-deductive arguments for mathematical propositions can be strong and play important roles in mathematics. But this paper proposes a necessary condition for knowledge that can be satisfied by putative proofs (and proof sketches), as well as by non-deductive arguments in science, but not by non-deductive arguments from mathematical evidence. The necessary condition concerns whether we can justly expect (...)
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  36. Snare's puzzle/Hume's purpose: Non-cognitivism and what Hume was really up to with no-ought-from-is.Charles Pigden - 2010 - In Hume on Is and Ought. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan.
    Frank Snare had a puzzle. Noncognitivism implies No-Ought-From-Is but No- Ought-From-Is does not imply non-cognitivism. How then can we derive non-cognitivism from No-Ought-From-Is? Via an abductive argument. If we combine non-cognitivism with the conservativeness of logic (the idea that in a valid argument the conclusion is contained in the premises), this implies No-Ought-From-Is. Hence if No-Ought-From-Is is true, we can arrive at non-cognitivism via an inference to the best explanation. With prescriptivism we can make this argument more precise. I develop (...)
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  37.  54
    Philosophy and Practice: Some Issues About War and Peace.R. M. Hare - 1984 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Lecture Series 18:1-15.
    I am going in this lecture on ‘Philosophy and Practice’ first to say something about philosophy and then something about practice, in order to show you how they bear on one another. But I must start by paying a tribute to the President of the Society for Applied Philosophy, Professor Sir A. J. Ayer, who has kindly agreed to take the chair at this lecture. I can honestly say that he is more responsible than anybody else for putting me on (...)
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  38.  88
    What is epistemically wrong with research affected by sponsorship bias? The evidential account.Alexander Reutlinger - 2020 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 10 (2):1-26.
    Biased research occurs frequently in the sciences. In this paper, I will focus on one particular kind of biased research: research that is subject to sponsorship bias. I will address the following epistemological question: what precisely is epistemically wrong with biased research of this kind? I will defend the evidential account of epistemic wrongness: that is, research affected by sponsorship bias is epistemically wrong if and only if the researchers in question make false claims about the evidential support of (...)
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  39. Dragging and Confirming.Matthew Kotzen - 2012 - Philosophical Review 121 (1):55-93.
    This essay addresses the question of when evidence for a stronger claim H1 also constitutes evidence for a weaker claim H2. Although the answer “Always” is tempting, it is false on a natural Bayesian conception of evidence. This essay first describes some prima facie counterexamples to this answer and surveys some weaker answers and rejects them. Next, it proposes an answer, which appeals to the “Dragging Condition.” After explaining and arguing for its use of (...)
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  40.  84
    On the Long Road to Mentalism in Children’s Spontaneous False-Belief Understanding: Are We There Yet?Jason Low & Bo Wang - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (3):411-428.
    We review recent anticipatory looking and violation-of-expectancy studies suggesting that infants and young preschoolers have spontaneous (implicit) understanding of mind despite their known problems until later in life on elicited (explicit) tests of false-belief reasoning. Straightforwardly differentiating spontaneous and elicited expressions of complex mental state understanding in relation to an implicit-explicit knowledge framework may be challenging; early action predictions may be based on behavior rules that are complementary to the mentalistic attributions under consideration. We discuss that the way forward (...)
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  41. The Ethics of False Belief.Timothy Lane - 2010 - EurAmerica 40 (3):591-633.
    According to Allen Wood’s “procedural principle” we should believe only that which can be justified by evidence, and nothing more. He argues that holding beliefs which are not justified by evidence diminishes our self-respect and corrupts us, both individually and collectively. Wood’s normative and descriptive views as regards belief are of a piece with the received view which holds that beliefs aim at the truth. This view I refer to as the Truth-Tracking View (TTV). I first present a (...)
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  42.  15
    Is past life regression therapy ethical?Gabriel Andrade - 2017 - Journal of Medical Ethics and History of Medicine 10.
    Past life regression therapy is used by some physicians in cases with some mental diseases. Anxiety disorders, mood disorders, and gender dysphoria have all been treated using life regression therapy by some doctors on the assumption that they reflect problems in past lives. Although it is not supported by psychiatric associations, few medical associations have actually condemned it as unethical. In this article, I argue that past life regression therapy is unethical for two basic reasons. First, it (...)
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  43. How Doxastic Justification Helps Us Solve the Puzzle of Misleading Higher-Order Evidence.Paul Silva - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (S1):308-328.
    Certain plausible evidential requirements and coherence requirements on rationality seem to yield dilemmas of rationality (in a specific, objectionable sense) when put together with the possibility of misleading higher-order evidence. Epistemologists have often taken such dilemmas to be evidence that we’re working with some false principle. In what follows I show how one can jointly endorse an evidential requirement, a coherence requirement, and the possibility of misleading higher-order evidence without running afoul of dilemmas of rationality. (...)
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  44.  24
    Some French Hegelians.Alfred Duhrssen - 1953 - Review of Metaphysics 7 (2):323 - 337.
    Camus thinks no conciliation possible, that the two doctrines can be maintained at the same time only by a sort of hypocrisy, that Sartre accords an absolute freedom to man only so that he may submit to the yoke of Marxism. But that is because Camus is ignorant of the merits of phenomenology. If Existentialism and Marx have too many corners to fit together, well, then Marx must be put in brackets and deprived of his natural presuppositions and pretensions. And (...)
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  45.  83
    Lay attitudes toward deception in medicine: Theoretical considerations and empirical evidence.Jonathan Pugh, Guy Kahane, Hannah Maslen & Julian Savulescu - 2016 - AJOB Empirical Bioethics 7 (1):31-38.
    Background: There is a lack of empirical data on lay attitudes toward different sorts of deception in medicine. However, lay attitudes toward deception should be taken into account when we consider whether deception is ever permissible in a medical context. The objective of this study was to examine lay attitudes of U.S. citizens toward different sorts of deception across different medical contexts. Methods: A one-time online survey was administered to U.S. users of the Amazon “Mechanical Turk” website. Participants were asked (...)
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  46. (1 other version)Epistemic innocence and the production of false memory beliefs.Katherine Puddifoot & Lisa Bortolotti - 2018 - Philosophical Studies:1-26.
    Findings from the cognitive sciences suggest that the cognitive mechanisms responsible for some memory errors are adaptive, bringing benefits to the organism. In this paper we argue that the same cognitive mechanisms also bring a suite of significant epistemic benefits, increasing the chance of an agent obtaining epistemic goods like true belief and knowledge. This result provides a significant challenge to the folk conception of memory beliefs that are false, according to which they are a sign of cognitive (...)
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  47.  38
    Object individuation by iconic content: How is numerosity represented in iconic representation?Athanasios Raftopoulos - 2020 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 11 (1):42-70.
    : Fodor argues that perceptual representations are a subset of iconic representations, which are distinguished from symbolic/discursive representations. Iconic representations are nonconceptual and they do not support the abilities afforded by concepts. Iconic representations, for example, cannot support object individuation. If someone thinks that perception or some of its parts has imagistic NCC, they face the following dilemma. Either they will have to accept that this NCC does not allow for object individuation, but it represents instead conglomerations of properties (...)
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  48. A new rationalist account of the development of false-belief understanding.Francesco Antilici - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (9):2847-2870.
    Rationalist accounts of the development of folk-psychology maintain that the acquisition of this capacity is aided by special-purpose mechanisms rich in innate structure. Rationalists have typically maintained that false-belief understanding (FBU) emerges very early on, before the age of two. To explain why young children nonetheless fail the false-belief task, rationalists have suggested that they may have troubles expressing their FBU. Here I do two things. First, I argue that extant proposals about what might prevent children from expressing (...)
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  49. Some Evidence Concerning Kierkegaard's Conception of the Meaning of Life which Based on the Creating of the Meaning.Meysam Amani & Reza Akbari - 2018 - Journal of Philosophical Investigations at University of Tabriz 12 (22):1-15.
    The present paper examines the concept of the meaning of life in the Soren Kierkegaard’s view. Kierkegaard sees the concept of "meaning" as "end" and believes in "biology" as the supreme biologist. Based on evidence from his works, he believes that the end is not to be discovered in biology, but it is creatable. There are three witnesses to this: first, the end is, in Kierkegaard''''''''s view, paradoxical, and paradox is not real, but mental. Secondly, Christianity, in his opinion, (...)
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  50.  35
    What evidence is total?Clark Glymour - unknown
    The Principle of Total Evidence is many things. We describe some of them.
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